USA v. Gil-Hernandez by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-10-2009 
USA v. Gil-Hernandez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Gil-Hernandez" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1889. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1889 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge for the United States*
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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jose Gil-Hernandez appeals his sentence for reentry after deportation in violation
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  We will affirm.
I.
As we write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the procedural
context and factual history of the case, we recount only those facts necessary to our
decision.
Gil-Hernandez entered an open guilty plea in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to a single count of reentry after deportation in
violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  Under his plea, Gil-Hernandez reserved the
right to challenge the imposition of a sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) and USSG § 2L1.2(b).  According to the Presentence Investigation Report,
The base offense level was 8 pursuant to USSG § 2L1.2(a).  The District Court1
then applied a 16-point enhancement based on Gil-Hernandez’s previous deportation for
prior conviction for a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded
13 months.  USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i).  Gil-Hernandez then received a three-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  USSG § 3E1.1.
The District Court had jurisdiction over the alleged violation of federal2
immigration laws pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction over an appeal
of Gil-Hernandez’s sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We
review procedural errors in sentencing for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007).  Procedural error includes a sentencing court’s refusal to consider
the § 3553(a) factors.  Id. at 597.
3
Gil-Hernandez had an offense level of 21  and a criminal history category of IV.  Neither1
Gil-Hernandez nor the Government objected to this calculation, and the District Court
adopted it, resulting in an advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 57-71 months.
In both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing before the
District Court, Gil-Hernandez sought a downward variance, arguing that because the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania did not have a fast-track program for illegal reentry
defendants, he would be subject to an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to
illegal reentry defendants in jurisdictions that have such a program.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6).  The District Court denied Gil-Hernandez’s motion and sentenced him to 57
months imprisonment.  Gil-Hernandez now appeals.2
II.
District courts must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 
Circuit courts of appeals have answered the question differently.  Compare United3
States v. Seval, No. 07-1204-cr., 2008 WL 4376826 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2008), and United
States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 229 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that a variance was
appropriate after Kimbrough “absent an unambiguous congressional directive barring
sentencing courts from considering” the disparity), with United States v. Vega-Castillo,
540 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d
554, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 624 (Dec. 1, 2008) (holding that
Kimbrough is not controlling on the issue of fast-track disparity because it “addressed
only a district court’s discretion to vary from the Guidelines based on disagreement with
4
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  In United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 199 (2007), we held that a disparity produced by the existence or absence of
fast-track programs could not be considered “unwarranted” because Congress implicitly
sanctioned that disparity when it authorized the selective institution of such programs in
the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).  See
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 98-99.  We found that “the establishment of fast-track programs is a
matter left to Congress and the Attorney General,” and where Congress authorizes a
disparity in sentencing, the disparity cannot serve as a ground to vary from the
Guidelines.  Id. at 100.
Here, the District Court relied exclusively on Vargas in rejecting Gil-Hernandez’s
request for a downward variance pursuant to § 3553(a)(6).  Gil-Hernandez argues that
Vargas is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
We have not yet spoken precedentially on the complicated and important question
of Kimbrough’s impact, if any, on fast-track sentencing disparities.   We decline to do so3
Guidelines, not Congressional policy”) (emphasis in original).
5
in this case, however, because our review of the record makes it ineluctably clear that Gil-
Hernandez did not proffer any evidence that he was treated differently than any similarly-
situated person who was prosecuted in a fast-track jurisdiction.  Gil-Hernandez bore the
burden of demonstrating similarity “by showing that other defendants’ ‘circumstances
exactly paralleled’ his.”  Vargas, 477 F.3d at 100 (quoting United States v. Charles, 467
F.3d 828, 8333 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Gil-Hernandez made only general reference to the
fact that individuals in fast-track jurisdictions are treated more favorably than those
arrested in other jurisdictions, such as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Such
generalized statements are plainly insufficient to demonstrate that Gil-Hernandez suffered
an unwarranted sentencing disparity pursuant to § 3553(a)(6) and a court should not
consider sentences imposed on defendants in other cases in the absence of evidence. 
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 100.
At oral argument, Gil-Hernandez’s counsel maintained that marshalling evidence
at his sentencing hearing regarding the punishments given to similarly-situated defendants
would have been a pointless exercise because Vargas foreclosed any argument under
§ 3553(a)(6) by making it clear that disparities between defendants in fast-track and non-
fast track jurisdictions were warranted.  We disagree.  Gil-Hernandez was sentenced on
January 7, 2008; Kimbrough – the case which Gil-Hernandez contends overruled Vargas
Gil-Hernandez’s sentencing memorandum, filed on November 20, 2007,4
referenced the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Kimbrough in order to preserve his
objection on the unwarranted disparity issue.  However, Gil-Hernandez made no
reference to facts sufficient to show that he was treated differently than similarly-situated
defendants in either his sentencing memorandum (which preceded Kimbrough) or at the
sentencing hearing (which post-dated Kimbrough).
If Gil-Hernandez needed time to marshal evidence after Kimbrough was decided,5
he could have filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing.
6
– was decided almost a month earlier on December 10, 2007.   Accordingly, Gil-4
Hernandez was free to argue that Kimbrough abrogated our holding in Vargas and he
could have presented evidence regarding the sentencing disparity to allow the District
Court to make an individualized assessment in his case.   Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.  Gil-5
Hernandez failed to do so and, therefore, did not carry his burden of proof in this case.
III.
Gil-Hernandez also challenges the use of a prior conviction to raise his statutory
maximum punishment.  The District Court applied 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which increases
the maximum penalty for illegal reentry from 2 years to 20 years for defendants who were
previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction.  Gil-Hernandez argues
that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the fact of his prior
conviction was neither charged in the indictment nor admitted at his guilty plea or proved
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  
As Gil-Hernandez concedes, this argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), and our decisions in
7
United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2006), and United States v.
Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
